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EFFICIENCY AND COST: THE IMPACT OF
VIDEOCONFERENCED HEARINGS ON
BAIL DECISIONS
SHARI SEIDMAN DIAMOND, * LOCKE E. BOWMAN, **
MANYEE WONG *** & MATTHEW M. PATTON ****
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past century, bail decisions have been affected
by two important developments that threaten the due process rights of
defendants. First, the American criminal justice system expanded the
reasons used to deny bail or to set high bond amounts. Second, and perhaps
not surprisingly in view of the increasing pressure placed on courts by a
growing docket of cases, American courts began to experiment with
technology as a way to reduce costs, including those created by the growing
volume of cases. The convergence of these two trends culminated in a
perfect storm in 1999 when Cook County, Illinois instituted the practice of
holding bail hearings for most felony cases using a closed circuit television
procedure (CCTP) that allowed the defendant to remain at a remote location
during the bail hearing.
The assumption that justified the implementation of the video system,
as with many criminal justice system reforms, was that it would reduce
costs without disadvantaging defendants. We examine here the history that
led Cook County to conduct bail hearings using the CCTP and the actual
impact that the change from live hearings to the CCTP produced for bail
outcomes. We begin in Part II by tracing the expansion of bail from a
mechanism designed to ensure that the defendant would appear for his trial
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to one that reduced the likelihood that the defendant would engage in
criminal behavior before being tried, that is, to achieve preventive
detention. Next, in Part III, we consider the growth of technology that
made it possible to hold remote bail hearings using the CCTP and how
courts have generally responded to legal challenges to the growing use of
technology in the justice system. Part IV outlines Cook County’s change
in policy in 1999 that brought the CCTP for bail hearings as well as the
federal lawsuit initiated in 2006 that challenged the use of the CCTP for
bail hearings, and our analysis of the impact of the change. Specifically,
using a time-series analysis, we examine the pattern of bail decisions in
Cook County for the eight years prior to and eight years following the
implementation of the CCTP. The results are dramatic. We find a sharp
increase in the average amount of bail set in cases subject to the CCTP, but
no change in cases that continued to have live hearings. The preliminary
results from this analysis were disclosed to all counsel in the litigation on
December 11, 2008 and were reported in the Chicago Tribune the next
day. 1 The lawsuit that initially stimulated this analysis was dismissed as
moot on December 15, 2008 when Cook County voluntarily returned to live
bail hearings for all felony cases and implemented other changes in the bail
hearing process. But questions remain about the potential uses of video
technology by criminal courts in bail hearings and other proceedings. In
Part V of this article, we discuss the future: the prospects and questions that
should be addressed as the criminal courts deal with the twenty-first century
and beyond.
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF BAIL
The institution of bail is deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence. It
traditionally reflected the criminal justice system’s purported desire to
balance the unfairness of confining, and thereby punishing, a person who
has not been convicted of any offense, and is presumed to be innocent, with
the need to ensure that the defendant will show up for his trial.
The origin of the bail procedure—and the fairness principle it seeks to
safeguard—dates at least to thirteenth century English law. The Statute of
Westminster the First of 1275 included an enumeration of non-capital
offenses for which pretrial release on bail was available, thereby codifying a
right (for those with financial means) not to be jailed and held prior to
conviction. 2 The statutory right of bail in enumerated cases laid out in the
1

Matthew Walberg, Video Bond Court to End, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2008, at 29.
Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 12 (Eng.). The most penetrating and
thorough treatment of the history of bail that the authors have found is Professor Caleb
Foote’s pointed account, given to support his (now outdated) argument that the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause incorporates a constitutional right to bail. See Caleb
2
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Statute of Westminster and in successor statutes had limits in practice,
which burst into the foreground in the seventeenth century. In 1627, in
Darnel’s Case, a group of knights who had been peremptorily jailed “by the
special command” of the king sought release on bail. 3 The judges refused.
That arbitrary ruling, and other similar abuses by a judiciary beholden to the
monarch, prompted the House of Commons in Parliament to adopt the
Petition of Right of 1628, which Charles I accepted. The Petition of Right
“brought the force of Magna Carta to bear upon pretrial imprisonment,”
affirming that there was a right not to be imprisoned or detained in noncapital cases without the ability to apply for bail.4
This ongoing “bail controversy,” which first produced the recognition
of the underlying right to bail via the Petition of Right, shifted half a
century later to questions regarding the procedure necessary to effectuate
that right. 5 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 included a recital regarding
judicial reluctance to consider bail even in cases in which bail was
appropriate: “many of the King’s subjects have beene . . . long detained in
Prison, in such cases where by law they are bailable.” 6 Among the items
included in the Habeas Corpus Act, therefore, were detailed provisions
designed to ensure that procedural technicalities did not prevent judges
from considering the defendant’s right to pretrial release.
Finally, the English Bill of Rights of 1689 included a provision,
similar to the Eighth Amendment, forbidding “excessive bail.”7 That
provision was added to remedy Parliament’s finding that the right of bail
was being “subverted” by judges who were setting bail in amounts that
could not be met. 8 These seventeenth century legislative efforts to solidify
and protect the institution of bail—the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus
Act, and the English Bill of Rights—all demonstrate, in Professor Foote’s
view, that “relief against abusive pretrial imprisonment was one of those
fundamental aspects of liberty which was of most concern during the
formative era of English law.” 9
Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 965 (1965).
There is a good, pithy, retelling of the story in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at
1565-66 (Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello & Kenneth R. Thomas eds., 2004); see also
Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 328 (1982).
3
See 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1627).
4
Foote, supra note 2, at 967.
5
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 2, at 1565.
6
31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
7
1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, cl. 10 (Eng.).
8
Foote, supra note 2, at 968.
9
Id.
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The notion that a person should not be unnecessarily detained before
trial is an accepted axiom of American law as well. Yet the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution includes only a spare,
ambiguous reference to the institution of bail: “Excessive bail shall not be
required.” 10 The Constitution also prohibits Congress from suspending the
“privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” 11 But the Constitution is silent on
whether there is an underlying constitutional right to bail.
Unquestionably, though, a long-standing American tradition allows
persons with financial means accused of non-capital crimes to post security
for their appearance at trial and obtain their release until that time. In
America, this tradition can be traced to the seventeenth century prerevolutionary era, roughly contemporaneous with the English bail
controversy. The right to bail in non-capital cases was included in the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, 12 in the New York Charter of
Liberties and Privileges of 1683, 13 and in the fundamental law of
Pennsylvania in 1682. 14 The right to bail was recognized and codified in
constitutions and statutes enacted just before the federal Constitution,
including the constitution of North Carolina in 1776 15 and the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. 16 A federal right to bail was codified in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which Congress enacted contemporaneously with its approval
of the Bill of Rights. 17 Then, over the span of many years following the
enactment of the Bill of Rights, a large majority of the states adopted state
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to bail in non-capital
cases, 18 leading one commentator to conclude that “[a] pervasive right to
bail developed in America in the years after 1789.” 19

10

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Id. at art. I, § 9.
12
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 2, at 1567; see also 1 DOCUMENTS ON
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 79, 82 (Zechariah Chafee ed., 1963).
13
1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 111,
114 (Robert C. Cumming ed., 1894).
14
Laws Agreed Upon in England, in PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE
CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790 25, 28 (1825).
15
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIX.
16
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LIV (2006).
17
Ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91 (1789) (providing that “bail shall be admitted” for a defendant
in any non-capital case).
18
See Note, supra note 2, at 351-55 (noting that every state to enter the Union, from
Kentucky in 1791 through Alaska in 1958, had a constitutional provision recognizing the
right to bail in non-capital cases. As of 1976, the constitutions of 40 states guaranteed a
right to bail for non-capital crimes).
19
Id. at 351.
11
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Though the formal recitation of a right to bail in state and federal
statutes and in state constitutions may have been commonplace, over the
course of American history, pretrial release on bail has not been pervasive
or anything like a universal right in practice. First, since the seventeenth
century, formal recognition of the right to bail has been limited to noncapital cases.20 Throughout much of our history, capital punishment was
available for many crimes other than the aggravated murder cases to which
that punishment is now almost exclusively confined.21 In any such capital
case, American law has always recognized that bail may be denied
altogether.
Second, even in the absence of systematic data regarding the
availability in practice of pretrial release on bail, 22 it is safe to presume that,
throughout this country’s history, pretrial release—even in non-capital
cases—was far from automatic. For accused persons whose poverty
precluded the posting of bail in any amount (the great majority of criminal
defendants), the ability to gain release prior to trial has always turned on the
magistrate’s willingness to grant non-financial release. Where the charged
offense was a non-trivial one, there is no evidence that such judicial
largesse was common. As Professor Foote points out, civil imprisonment
for debt was commonplace in the United States throughout the nineteenth
and even into the twentieth century. 23 In that context, the routine pretrial
incarceration of poor persons accused of a crime of violence or a serious
property crime is unlikely to have provoked public ire, or even notice.
A couple of noteworthy nineteenth century judicial opinions pay lip
service to the notion that a person not yet proven guilty should not be
incarcerated unless doing so is necessary to secure his presence at trial.
United States v. Lawrence involved the setting of bail for the would-be
assassin of President Jackson. 24 The record of the case includes Chief
Judge Cranch’s observation that “to require larger bail than the prisoner
20

Id. at 345.
See generally Raymond T. Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 17 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 234, 241-42
(1926) (asserting that early colonies had as many as a dozen capital crimes and cataloguing
states’ wide and non-uniform range of capital crimes as of 1926—including rape, kidnapping
for ransom, train robbery, and burglary); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593
(1976) (stating that rape was a capital crime in sixteen states as of 1971 and that within the
previous fifty years it had never been a capital crime in a majority of states).
22
The Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics only began its comprehensive
data compilations after the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Professor Foote’s extensive treatment
of bail history cites to a few isolated bail studies from the mid-twentieth century. See Foote,
supra note 2, at 995-96. We know of no earlier data compilations.
23
Id. at 991.
24
26 F. Cas. 887 (C.C.D.C. 1835).
21
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could give would be to require excessive bail, and to deny bail in a case
clearly bailable by law.” 25 Bail was ultimately set at $1,500. 26 In a later
case, the Supreme Court rendered this expansive reading of the federal bail
statute:
The only “proper security” . . . in a criminal case, is security for the appearance of a
prisoner admitted to bail. . . . The statutes of the United States have been framed upon
the theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged
guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or
27
punishment . . . .

But these isolated pronouncements did not evolve into meaningful
doctrine. No American court from the founding through the mid-twentieth
century grappled with the federal constitutional question of whether there is
a right to bail. There has never been an occasion for any court to seriously
address the disconnect between the lofty ideal that the presumptively
innocent criminally accused person should not be unnecessarily
incarcerated before trial, on the one hand, and the highly discriminatory
effects upon the poor of the institution of bail in practice, on the other.
During much of our history, there is virtually no record of judicial concern
about “relief against abusive pretrial imprisonment,” the issue that
Professor Foote found so dominant in the formative phase of English law. 28
For a brief window of time, prompted by executive and judicial abuses
in the post-World War II era, it appeared that the Supreme Court might
recognize a constitutional right to bail as a bulwark against such abuses. In
the 1951 case of Stack v. Boyle, 29 the Court refused to uphold the bail set
for twelve defendants accused of sedition under the Smith Act.30 The bail
set in that case—$50,000 for each defendant—was obviously intended to
ensure the punitive pretrial incarceration of the defendants, not to guarantee
25

Id. at 888. Lawrence had fired a pistol twice in the President’s direction, but had
missed both times, leading Judge Cranch to the view that, since no actual battery had
occurred, the offense was a bailable one. Id. at 887-88.
26
Id. at 88.
27
Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
28
Controversies regarding unjustified or arbitrary detention played out in different
contexts, such as the availability of the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1869).
29
342 U.S. 1 (1951).
30
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. IV 1951). The Smith Act, which made it a crime, among
other things, to “teach[] the . . . desirability” of overthrowing any state or the federal
government by violence, id., furnished the basis for a number of controversial prosecutions
of union leaders, Communists, and other leftists during the 1940s and 1950s. See, e.g.,
ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 49-53
(2d ed. 2002) (describing the Smith Act trial of Communist Party leaders over the course of
eleven months in 1948 and 1949, which ultimately reached the Supreme Court as Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).

2010]

EFFICIENCY AND COST

875

their presence at the trial. Writing in dicta, the Court commented that “[the]
traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment
prior to conviction. . . . Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would
lose its meaning.” 31
Without elaboration, Stack also indicated that there were
“constitutional standards for admission to bail.”32 If, as Stack hinted, a
constitutional “right” to bail were to be found—either by implication from
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause or as a requirement of
substantive due process—then it could well follow that the sole legitimate
purposes for requiring bail as a condition of pretrial release are to ensure the
defendant’s attendance at trial, to protect the safety of witnesses, and
otherwise to protect the integrity of the criminal trial process to follow.33
Thus, setting bail for some other purpose—in order to prevent the defendant
from committing additional crimes prior to trial and to protect the public
from the defendant’s perceived criminal propensities, for example—would
be “excessive,” procedurally unfair, or both.
The Stack decision led Professor Foote, writing in 1965, to envision a
“[c]oming [c]onstitutional [c]risis in [b]ail” 34 in which the Court would
address the existence of a constitutional right to bail and, Foote imagined,
would be forced to confront, as a constitutional matter, the pervasive and
disturbing “pretrial imprisonment of the poor solely as a result of their
poverty, under harsher conditions than those applied to convicted
prisoners.” 35 No such constitutional crisis ensued, however. Instead, the
Supreme Court shut the door on the existence of a constitutional right to
bail in United States v. Salerno,36 a case challenging the constitutionality of
the federal detention statute’s provision permitting federal judicial officers
to consider, inter alia, whether pretrial release of the defendant would be a
danger to the public. 37 The Court upheld this form of preventive detention,
approvingly quoted dicta from an earlier case38 to the effect that the Eighth
Amendment affords no right to bail, and made clear that neither substantive

31

Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 6.
33
See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 330-32; see also Brief of Respondent, United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1986) (No. 86-87).
34
Foote, supra note 2, at 959.
35
Id. at 960.
36
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
37
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1982).
38
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1951).
32
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due process nor the Excessive Bail Clause regulate what factors may be
considered in setting bail.39
Salerno thus placed a judicial imprimatur upon the legislative
movement of the 1970s and early 1980s authorizing preventive detention of
defendants whose alleged crimes (or criminal histories) made them appear
to be a threat to public safety; by 1984, over two-thirds of the states had
adopted some kind of provision authorizing consideration of the
defendant’s “dangerousness” in setting bail. 40
Pretrial release on bond, of course, remained (and remains) a fixture of
the federal and state criminal justice systems, without which these systems
could not continue to function.41 Nonetheless, while many defendants are
granted some form of pretrial release, substantial numbers remain in
custody prior to trial, either because they have been denied bail or because
the bail set by the court exceeds what they can provide to be released on
bond. In 2004, the most recent year for which data are available, almost
three-quarters (72.6%) of all defendants accused of violent offenses were
not released from custody prior to trial (either on bail or on some form of
recognizance or conditional release). In murder cases, 77% of defendants
remained in custody prior to trial. 42
As the Supreme Court was approving more restrictive rights to pretrial
release, the crime rate in the United States was approaching an all-time
high, a level reached in 1991. 43 In Illinois, the site of the empirical study
described here, as in the rest of the country, the rate of both violent and
property crime rose dramatically from 1967 through the 1980s.44 The
violent crime rate in Illinois peaked in 1991 at 250% of its 1967 rate,
remaining at more than double the 1967 level through 1998. 45 The property
crime rate also grew substantially, doubling between 1967 and 1991, and

39

481 U.S. at 741-55.
John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 74 (1985).
41
See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding a judicial
order directing the release on bond of persons accused of non-violent crimes in order to
eliminate jail overcrowding).
42
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004 46 tbl.3.1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf (reflecting data from October 2003 through September 30, 2004).
43
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008 192
tbl.299 (127th ed. 2008).
44
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crime and Justice Data Online,
1960-2007,
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStateby
State.cfm (search “Illinois” and “Violent crime rates” and “Property crime rates” from years
1960 to 2007; then follow “Get Table” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
45
Id.
40
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staying well above its 1967 rate throughout the 1990s. 46 Thus, the support
for restrictive bail policies and increased pressure on the system caused by
high crime rates converged to encourage courts to find efficient ways to
handle the demands placed on them. They found welcome potential in
developing technology.
III. THE EXPANSION OF TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The legal system is generally slow to embrace new technology. Yet
many courts have responded with enthusiasm to video technology, with its
promise of convenience and cost savings. Although videoconferencing was
technologically “possible since the creation of the television,” it became
less prohibitively expensive by the early 1990s with the advent of digital
technology. 47
Videoconferenced hearings have become increasingly common in
legal proceedings, where their adoption is fueled by the attractions of
convenience and the reduction of transportation and other costs associated
with live proceedings. Videoconferenced hearings also have the benefit of
reducing safety concerns when prisoners or potentially volatile mentally
disturbed individuals are involved, because transporting those individuals to
court for a live hearing may pose a security risk. All of these considerations
have led to sharp increases in the use of remote video feeds in conducting
administrative and civil proceedings, as well as hearings dealing with
criminal matters ranging from bail to sentencing. 48
Courts are not the only beneficiaries of this technology. Some courts
report that defendants who wish to avoid the travel costs of appearing for a
hearing in a misdemeanor case appreciate the availability of a lower cost
method of participating in the proceeding. 49
Illinois was a pioneer in the use of video technology, but it was
followed soon by other states. “An Illinois court first used video
technology to conduct videophone bail hearings in 1972.” 50 Soon after, in
1974, “[a] Philadelphia court installed a closed-circuit television system for
46

Id.
Jim Poniente, The History of Videoconferencing, EZINEARTICLES.COM, Aug. 28, 2007,
http://ezinearticles.com/?The-History-of-Videoconferencing&id=707634.
48
MICHAEL G. NEIMON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CAN INTERACTIVE VIDEO WORK
IN WAUKESHA COUNTY? AN ANALYSIS AND SURVEY 14 (2001), available at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/tech&CISOPTR=120
(“With 29 states engaging in the use of video for court proceedings, video use can no longer
be perceived as new.”).
49
Patricia Raburn-Remfry, Due Process Concerns in Video Production of Defendants,
23 STETSON L. REV. 805, 812 (1994).
50
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BRIEFING PAPERS: VIDEOCONFERENCING (1995),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_tech/archive/briefing/vc.htm.
47
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preliminary arraignments.” 51 “In the . . . 20 years [following] these initial
experiments, . . . courts in 17 states . . . invested in videoconferencing
systems,” primarily for use in arraignments. 52 By 2002, over half of the
states permitted some types of criminal proceedings to be held by
videoconference. 53
The use of videoconferencing also spread to the federal courts, spurred
on by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which required courts “to
the extent practicable” to avoid removing petitioners from the prison facility
for pretrial proceedings in prison condition cases. 54 The Act permitted
proceedings “in which the prisoner’s participation is required or permitted”
to be held “by telephone, videoconference, or other telecommunications
technology.” The 1996 legislation that followed endorsed this technology
“as a way to [reduce] security [threats] and costs associated with
transporting prisoners to court,” but also to reduce “frivolous claims by
prisoners . . . looking for a way to spend . . . time out of prison.” 55
Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 and 10, which went
into effect on December 1, 2002, permit videoconferencing for initial
appearance and arraignments, but only with the defendant’s consent. 56
Although a proposed amendment to Rule 26 would have permitted
videoconferencing for presentation of live testimony during trial, the change
was rejected by the Supreme Court because of concerns under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 57
Defense attorneys, legal scholars, and judges have offered a variety of
arguments against the use of videoconferencing in criminal cases. They
have argued that the use of videoconferencing impairs the fairness and
integrity of criminal proceedings in a variety of ways:
Where witnesses testify outside of the presence of the defendant, the
defendant is deprived of the opportunity for a physical meeting—a
51

Id.
Id.
53
Gerald D. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience of the Guillotine?: Video
Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 63, 76 (2002). “Arraignments
and initial appearances [were] the proceedings most commonly permitted to be conducted by
[videoconference].” Id. at 76 n.95.
54
Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Videoconferencing in Criminal
Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research, 28 LAW & POL’Y
211, 213 (2006) [hereinafter Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings] (quoting Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f)(2) (2006)).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 213-14.
57
Id. at 214; see J. ANTONIN SCALIA, STATEMENT ON AMENDMENTS TO RULE 26(B) OF THE
FEDERAL
RULES
OF
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
1-2
(2002),
available
at
http://host4.uscourts.gov/rules/CR-26b.pdf.
52
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confrontation—with those who provide evidence against him, an
arguable violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.58
Where the defendant and his counsel are physically separated during a
hearing, the defendant loses the opportunity to pass notes to his
counsel or to have an impromptu whispered conference with counsel,
arguably an infringement of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 59
Where the defendant is “present” for a proceeding as no more than an
image on a video monitor, there is a diminution of the court’s ability
to gauge such matters as the defendant’s credibility, his competence,
his physical and psychological wellbeing, his ability to understand the
proceedings, and the voluntariness of any waivers of rights that the
defendant may be called upon to make—all of which raise serious
procedural due process concerns. 60
Finally, whenever the defendant is not physically present before the
court, the court or other fact-finder loses the opportunity to respond to
the immediacy of the defendant’s human presence and the gravity of
the proceeding is diminished, arguably causing a violation of
procedural and substantive due process. 61
Conducting a full criminal trial using CCTP would undoubtedly
present grave Confrontation Clause concerns, among others. Before a court
may receive testimony from even a single witness by means of
videoconference, the state must demonstrate, as to that witness, that
58
In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1989), the Supreme Court noted that a
“face-to-face meeting” between the defendant and the witnesses appearing against him is a
literal requirement of the Confrontation Clause. The Court went on to hold that an
“important state interest” can trump that requirement; found such an interest in sparing a
child victim-witness the ordeal of meeting her abuser in court; and therefore upheld the
decision to allow the child’s testimony by closed circuit video. Id. at 852. As we point out
in the text below, the use of CCTP to transmit the defendant’s image into the courtroom in
criminal cases has largely been confined to hearings in which no witnesses are anticipated to
testify—and, thus, the Confrontation Clause issue has not been addressed in any of the
reported decisions regarding CCTP that the authors have found.
59
Commentators have noted that the inability of an attorney to in be two places at once
(both in the courtroom and at a remote location with her client) poses communication
problems that could inappropriately burden the right to counsel.
See, e.g.,
Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings, supra note 54, at 217. A version of this
contention was laid out in the complaint in Mason v. County of Cook, No. 06 C 3449 (N.D.
Ill. 2006), discussed in Section IV, infra. But the court never ruled on the Sixth Amendment
question.
60
See, e.g., United States v. Algere, 457 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (E.D. La. 2005) (rejecting
the defense argument and reasoning that video afforded the court an equal opportunity to
observe the defendant and assess his competence as if the defendant were physically
present).
61
See, e.g., United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]elevision is
no substitute for direct personal contact. Video tape is still a picture, not a life.”) (quoting
Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d
300, 304 (4th Cir. 2001).
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videoconferencing, as opposed to live testimony, is “necessary to further an
important state interest.” 62 Such an interest has been found where
videoconferencing will protect the emotional and psychological wellbeing
of a child sexual assault victim. 63 But, to the authors’ knowledge, no
jurisdiction has suggested that achieving the kinds of efficiencies that
CCTP affords is sufficiently “necessary” and “important” to justify
dispensing with the defendant’s physical presence for a criminal trial.64
In contrast, the lower federal and state courts have been generally,
though not universally, receptive to the use of CCTP for criminal
proceedings prior to the trial itself. At the far end of the spectrum, the
courts have had little difficulty with videoconferenced arraignments, which
have been uniformly upheld. 65 No witnesses testify at arraignment,
eliminating Confrontation Clause concerns. Although in some states
arraignment is considered a “critical stage,” and the defendant is therefore
entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the largely ceremonial and
perfunctory nature of the arraignment process leaves little or no need for
on-the-spot consultations between the defendant and his lawyer. 66 No
judicial decisions are made at arraignment, and, thus, due process concerns
are also absent.
Significantly more problematic are proceedings in which the court
must accept a defendant’s waiver of rights, make a judgment regarding the
defendant’s competence, suitability for involuntary medication, or the
admissibility of evidence, or render a decision as to the appropriate
punishment. Here the decisions are divided. Some courts have held that a
court may accept a defendant’s plea of guilty and waiver of rights using
CCTP, 67 while others have held that the Constitution requires the
defendant’s physical presence for such hearings. 68 One court has held that
62

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1989).
Id.
64
The Supreme Court’s ongoing concern with protecting the Confrontation Clause rights
of defendants was on display in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009),
where the court found that the admission of certificates claiming the substances analyzed
were cocaine, offered in place of testimony from the analysts, violated the Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 2532. This case, and the Court’s rejection of proposed amendments to Rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, suggests that the Court would swiftly and
firmly condemn use of CCTP for a criminal trial. See Videoconferencing in Criminal
Proceedings, supra note 54, at 214.
65
See, e.g., In re Rule 3.160(a), Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 528 So.2d 1179 (Fla.
1988); People v. Lindsey, 772 N.E.2d 1268 (Ill. 2002); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 46
S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2001); State v. Phillips, 656 N.E.2d 643 (Ohio 1995); Commonwealth v.
Terebieniec, 408 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
66
See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
67
See, e.g., State v. Peters, 615 N.W.2d 655 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
68
See, e.g., People v. Stroud, 804 N.E.2d 510, 519 (Ill. 2004).
63
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it is permissible to use CCTP to conduct a Sell 69 hearing on whether the
defendant should be involuntarily medicated to render him competent to
stand trial. 70 Another court has held that it is constitutionally permissible to
conduct a sentencing hearing by videoconference.71 Other courts have held
or implied that it would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to use
closed circuit video for a sentencing hearing. 72
The authors have found only one case ruling on the constitutionality of
using CCTP to conduct a bail hearing. 73 Bail hearings are not typically an
occasion for witnesses to testify against the defendant (the state usually
proceeds by way of proffer as to the seriousness of the crime and the
defendant’s criminal history) and, thus, Confrontation Clause problems are
generally absent. On the other hand, bail hearings do require a judicial
determination as to the defendant’s trustworthiness and character—i.e., the
likelihood that he will in fact appear for trial if released.74 There is
certainly reason to believe that the opportunity to physically observe the
defendant would contribute information that would be useful for that
determination. 75 Given that the defendant’s freedom prior to trial is a
matter of great consequence, there is at least a serious argument that
procedural due process requires the defendant’s physical presence at a bail
hearing.
It is important that the defendant and his counsel be able to
communicate effectively during the course of a bail hearing. The defendant
may, for example, be able to point out errors in the records of his criminal
history or to provide mitigating details regarding past convictions that will
greatly assist counsel in presenting the case for a non-financial release or a
low bond. Obviously, such communications must occur immediately if
counsel is to be able to make use of his client’s information during a fast69

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2002).
United States v. Algere, 457 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. La. 2005).
71
Scott v. State, 618 So.2d 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
72
See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999).
73
LaRose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough County Corr. Admin., 702 A.2d 326, 329
(N.H. 1997), discussed infra at Section V, holds that videoconferenced bail hearings are
constitutionally permissible.
74
Under the federal detention statute, for example, the judicial officer conducting the
hearing is required to assess the “character, physical and mental condition” of the defendant
in assessing his suitability for pretrial release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (2006).
75
In United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the court held that
the decision as to the defendant’s eligibility for bail pending appeal must be made in the trial
court in the first instance, the court noted that the trial court is the “superior tribunal” for
making that determination because it “can come face-to-face with the primary informational
sources, probe for what is obscure, trap what is elusive, and settle what is controversial.” Id.
at 581-82.
70
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paced bail hearing. In this context, therefore, separating the defendant from
counsel might be argued to infringe on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 76
Where the courts have found the defendant’s presence to be a
constitutional necessity, it has generally been because of the intuition that
the defendant’s presence affects perceptions and contributes to the outcome.
For example, in holding that the defendant’s presence was required for
sentencing, the Fifth Circuit reasoned: “Sentencing a defendant by video
conferencing creates the risk of a disconnect that can occur because ‘the
immediacy of a living person is lost.’ . . . ‘[T]elevision is no substitute for
direct personal contact. Video tape is still a picture, not a life.’”77 In
contrast, courts that have approved the use of videoconferencing have
assumed that closed circuit video does not detract in any meaningful way
from the quality of judicial decision making: “[T]he Court finds that its
opportunity to continuously observe [the defendant] by video
teleconference during the hearing is as effective as if [the defendant] were
to appear in person before the Court.” 78
Thus, the decisions and the arguments embody empirical assumptions
about how videoconferencing is likely to affect case outcomes and
perceptions of justice. Does video rather than live interaction deprive the
defendant of effective attorney-client communication and thus impair
adequate representation? Does video reduce the ability of the judge to
76

The Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on whether a bail hearing is a “critical
stage” of the criminal process to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would attach.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122-23 (1975), the Court held that counsel was not
required at a hearing to determine probable cause and went on to suggest that states might
wish to experiment with combining bail hearings with probable cause determinations.
Gerstein, thus, casts considerable doubt on whether there is a constitutional right to counsel
at a bail hearing. But Gerstein did not decide the question. More recently (in an opinion that
also did not definitively rule on this question) the Court indicated that counsel might be
constitutionally required at such a combined hearing. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128
S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (“[A] criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial
officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks
the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.”). Only the District of Columbia and eight other states have enacted
provisions ensuring that all indigent persons within their borders are represented by counsel
at bail or bond hearings. See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1724
nn.6-8 (2002) (collecting statutes). Although in practice in many jurisdictions lawyers do
not represent bond applicants, there has never been a significant Sixth Amendment challenge
to the lack of representation at a bail or bond hearing.
77
Navarro, 169 F.3d at 239 (quoting Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir.
1993)).
78
United States v. Algere, 457 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (E.D. La. 2005) (approving
videoconferenced Sell hearing).
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appreciate the humanity of the defendant and reach an appropriate decision?
Yet no prior empirical research has directly tested how—or even whether—
videoconferencing produces results that differ from those produced by live
hearings. 79 Molly Treadway Johnson and Elizabeth Wiggins reviewed the
available literature in 2006 and called for experimentation to fill that gap. 80
We report here on a study we conducted that responds to that empirical
challenge.
IV. THE CCTP: VIDEOCONFERENCED BAIL HEARINGS IN COOK COUNTY
A. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VIDEOCONFERENCED BAIL HEARINGS
AND THE GENESIS OF A LAWSUIT

Cook County, which includes Chicago and the greater metropolitan
area, decided in 1999 to implement an extensive program mandating that
bail hearings for most defendants arrested within the City of Chicago and
charged with a felony be held via videoconference rather than at a live bail
hearing attended in person by the defendant. Mirroring the approach taken
with other reforms embracing video technology, Cook County implemented
a general order directing that most bail hearings in felony cases conducted
in Chicago’s Central Bond Court “shall be conducted by means of closed
circuit television.” 81 The only felonies excluded from this 1999 General
Order were the most serious felony cases (typically homicides and serious
sexual assaults) in which Illinois law permitted the State to seek denial of
bond in any amount. 82
Cook County’s introduction of the CCTP was the final step in a staged
process of centralizing the bail hearing procedure for Chicago arrests. In
the last months of 1998, all such bail hearings were transferred for hearing
to the Chicago criminal courts building on the city’s West Side. This
replaced a system, in effect for many years previously, in which bail
hearings had been conducted in police “branch” courts located throughout
Chicago. It was felt that a centralized approach would further the interests
of uniformity and efficiency. 83 The bond amounts would be more
uniform—and, in that sense, fairer—if they were all set by judges in a
centralized court rather than by a half dozen different judges sitting in
79

There is even a possibility that videoconference technology helps some defendants by
making them appear less dangerous than they might in person.
80
Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings, supra note 54, at 225.
81
General Order 99-6 of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (1999).
82
Id.
83
Comments of Judge Robert A. Bastone, one of the architects of the Central Bond
Court reform, in a meeting with bar leaders held in the chambers of the Chief Judge in midJuly 2005.
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courtrooms around the city. 84 Efficiency would also be served: all persons
arrested within the past twenty-four hours anywhere in Chicago would be
transported to holding pens in the basement of the Chicago criminal courts
building. 85 That building is connected by underground tunnel with the
Cook County Jail, which would enable relatively swift processing of the
defendants (either their release or their admission to the jail) following the
hearings. Adding the CCTP to the Central Bond Court in 1999 was
intended to further promote efficiency by enabling swift disposition of all
the cases on the call by allowing the defendants to “appear” at the bail
hearing via video transmission from a basement room located a few steps
from the holding pens. 86
No research was conducted before or during the initial period when the
1999 General Order was implemented to evaluate its likely or actual effect.
In practice, use of CCTP in Central Bond Court had several troubling
features:
Poor-quality technology. The defendant’s image was shown on video
monitors visible to the judge and to spectators (who sit in a gallery
separated from the well of the courtroom by a Plexiglas shield), but
not to the prosecutor or defense counsel. The image on the monitors
was black and white, the contrast was poor (making dark-skinned
defendants particularly difficult to see) and the screens sometimes
flickered. 87
Inadequate defense preparation.
Because of the logistics of
transporting arrestees to the criminal courts building each day, public
defenders (who handled the overwhelming majority of the cases)
complained that their opportunity to consult with their clients prior to
the hearings was extremely limited. 88 On a daily basis, 100 to 150
bail cases were heard on the Central Bond Court call.89 An
investigator employed by the Cook County Public Defender’s Office
met each bail applicant for a few seconds at the front of the holding
pen, recording basic information about each defendant onto a chart. 90
The assistant public defender in the courtroom (who had never met the

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Two of the authors made this observation when they observed proceedings in Central
Bond Court in the fall of 2008. See also Letter to Cook County Chief Judge Timothy C.
Evans, Circuit Court of Cook County & Judge Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Circuit Court of Cook
County (June 20, 2005) (on file with author).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
85
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bail applicant) parroted the information from the chart into the record
as the defendant’s image flickered on the monitors in the courtroom. 91
Extreme brevity. The cases were heard rapid-fire. In each case, the
court made a probable cause finding, 92 set bond, and continued the
case for hearing on a future date—all in the space of about thirty
seconds on average. 93 In so short a time frame it was impossible for
the court to give any meaningful, individualized consideration to the
multitude of factors that Illinois law deems relevant to the setting of
bail. 94
Complaints about this system began to surface. For years, defense
lawyers decried Central Bond Court as a grossly demeaning “cattle call.”95
In March 2005, a committee of prominent bar leaders wrote an open letter
to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County questioning the
constitutionality of Central Bond Court and calling for its abolition.96 A
December 2007 report by the Chicago Appleseed Fund on the Cook County
criminal justice system recommended eliminating the CCTP in Central
Bond Court. 97 Privately, public defenders contended that a return to the
decentralized branch court system would be preferable: under the old
system, cases had received more individualized attention from the public
defenders assigned to the branch courtrooms (those public defenders had
handled a dozen or more bail cases each day as opposed to the 100-plus
daily cases at Central Bond Court); under the old system, it was easier for
family members and friends of the defendant to attend (and to be available
for testimony) at a bail hearing relatively near to the defendant’s
neighborhood; and under the old system the defendants had the advantage
of being physically present in the courtroom. 98
91

Id.
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
93
On several occasions during the pendency of the litigation described below, students
from Northwestern University School of Law’s MacArthur Justice Center observed Central
Bond Court and timed a sampling of the bond hearings. See also Tom McNamee, 50
Minutes ÷ 113 People = 26.55 Seconds per Case; Court System Forces Attorneys through
Fast and Furious Pace, with Hardly a Hint of Justice, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 20, 2005, at 22.
94
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/ 110-5 (2005).
95
The term “cattle call” was frequently used to describe Central Bond Court in
conversations that one of the authors had with Cook County Public Defenders and private
criminal defense practitioners in 2005 and 2006.
96
A copy of the letter is on file with the authors.
97
CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, A REPORT ON
CHICAGO’S FELONY COURTS 60 (2007), available at http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/
uploads/view/1/download:1/criminal_justice_full_report.pdf.
98
In conversations with one of the authors in 2005 and 2006, high level members of the
Cook County Public Defender’s Office, including the public defender himself, expressed
their preference for conducting bail hearings in the branch courts, for the reasons stated in
the text.
92
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In 2006, Locke Bowman, of the MacArthur Justice Center, filed a
class action suit in federal court in Chicago alleging that the bail hearings in
Cook County’s Central Bond Court violated due process and denied bail
applicants the effective assistance of counsel.99 The suit sought injunctive
relief on behalf of all present and future bail applicants—primarily
elimination of the CCTP and the institution of procedures that would permit
counsel to better prepare for the individual hearings—and a declaratory
judgment that the Central Bond Court hearings were unconstitutional.100
The defendants in the case—the Cook County Sheriff, the Cook
County Public Defender, and the Circuit Court Judge with administrative
authority over Central Bond Court—never challenged the legal sufficiency
of the due process and Sixth Amendment claims in the complaint.101 As the
case progressed through discovery toward an evidentiary hearing, Locke
Bowman and Shari Diamond discussed how to assess whether bail
We
outcomes were affected by the videoconferencing system. 102
determined that an empirical test would be both valuable and possible.
Accordingly, we gathered information from the Cook County Clerk’s
Office on the initial bail hearings for all felony cases in Cook County
covering the period from approximately eight and one-half years before the
video system went into effect through the eight and one-half years after it
was implemented. 103

99

Mason v. County of Cook, No. 06 C 3449 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2006).
Id.
101
The defendants did argue that the federal court should abstain from hearing the case
under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The court rejected that
argument. Mason v. County of Cook, 488 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
102
It could, of course, have been argued that even in the absence of actual injury (in the
form of higher bond amounts than would have been imposed in in-person and appropriately
counseled hearings) the bond applicants’ constitutional rights were being violated by
deficient procedures. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (“Because the right
to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of
a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that
procedural due process be observed, . . . we believe that the denial of procedural due process
should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”) (citing Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
103
The data for the analysis were provided in the form of computer files supplied by
Karen Landon, Project Manager in the M.E.S. Division of the Office of the Clerk of the
Cook County Circuit Court, in response to a subpoena served on the Clerk of Court in
Mason, No. 06 C 3449, on June 5, 2007. The subpoena requested computerized data on the
felony bail hearings conducted in Central Bond Court in Courtroom 101 of the Criminal
Courts building from 1991 through 1999.
100
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B. THE DATA

A total of 645,117 felony bond decision case files 104 were supplied by
the Clerk of Cook County for felony cases that had initial bail hearings
between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2007. Each case file included:
(1) the date on which a bail applicant appeared for a bail hearing, and (2)
the statute number associated with the first offense with which the
defendant was charged. Two-thirds of the cases also included a verbal
description of the first offense with which the defendant was charged (e.g.,
“possession of a stolen motor vehicle”) or an abbreviation for the name of
the offense (e.g., “psmv” for possession of a stolen motor vehicle).
In addition to examining changes in bond amount over time for the full
set of felony cases, we also analyzed changes in bond amount over time for
individual offenses. Due to the incomplete or ambiguous verbal offense
descriptions in the computer files, we used a series of procedures and
checks to identify the offense category for each case. We began with the
statute number for the offense. The statute entries in the computer files
were not formatted consistently (e.g., whether a hyphen or parenthesis was
included). Because the statute numbers were not formatted consistently, we
first removed all non-numeric characters from the statute codes. We then
used a string function to search these numeric statute codes for the substring
that uniquely identified each particular offense, allowing us to identify the
offense. For example, statute codes that contained “103” were identified as
possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
We used the statute number rather than the verbal offense description
as the primary source for identifying the offense associated with the case
because: (a) nearly one-third of the cases lacked a written offense
description, and (b) the way an offense was described verbally varied
substantially across entries (e.g., “psmv” or “poss stol mv” or “possession
of stolen motor vehicle”). To test whether this procedure had correctly
identified only the appropriate offense, we examined the offense
descriptions for these cases (in this example, those with the statute code
“103”) to make sure they described the right offense (in this instance,
possession of a stolen motor vehicle). To verify that other cases of
possession of a stolen motor vehicle had not been missed because the
offense was listed under another statute number that did not contain “103,”
104
The original data files provided by the Clerk’s Office included multiple “cases” for
the same bond decision if multiple charges were involved. The single bond amount set at the
bond hearing was entered in the data set for each charge. To create a data set using bond
decision as the unit of analysis, we used the first (most serious) charge, giving us a total of
645,117 bond decisions. We identified cases from the same bond decision by matching on
the following criteria: last name; first name; date of birth, if available; date of bond hearing;
and bond amount.
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we examined all of the statute numbers associated with common written
descriptions of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. We also checked to
see that the string function had not identified any group of at least fifty
cases that described a different offense. In no instance did this checking
procedure produce groups of misclassified cases. Each of the nine offenses
we analyzed separately underwent this verification process.
Both verification procedures showed that cases of each offense had
been correctly identified, that is, that we did not include cases that did not
belong or omit cases that should have been included according to the listed
statute number. The only potentially omitted cases were the 0.1% of cases
in which no statute number was provided in the data file.
We also conducted a second check on the data used in the analyses.
We identified thirty-three cases (sixteen in the pre-videoconferencing
period and seventeen in the videoconferencing period) with unusually high
bond levels, in light of the charged offense (e.g., $9,000,000 for possession
of a stolen motor vehicle). We were able to obtain the paper court files on
twenty-nine of those cases and found that ten had been entry errors,
typically involving an extra zero or two that made the amount appear ten or
one hundred times its actual value. We corrected the entries for all
analyses. We were unable to obtain the case files for two armed robbery
case outliers that had hearings in October of 1999, just after
videoconferencing was implemented. Each had a bond amount recorded as
$5,000,000. Although we conducted all analyses with and without these
two cases and found no difference in the results, the charts and table
presented here exclude the two cases because the exclusion provides more
conservative estimates of the effects. 105
C. THE ANALYTIC APPROACH

We began our analysis by examining changes in bail level over time
for all cases involving offenses that were subjected to the CCTP. Then, to
examine the consistency of results across different offenses, we conducted
separate analyses on a series of offense categories that could be identified
accurately from the available data. 106 These offenses were nonresidential

105

We conducted an additional check on the ten cases which appeared in the computer
file from the Clerk’s Office as first degree murder and released on recognizance. We
obtained seven of the original ten paper files which showed that all were entry errors, two
not involving first degree murder and five having bail decisions that were not “released on
recognizance.” We corrected the errors and removed the remaining three cases from all
specific offense analyses.
106
Drug offenses were not examined separately because the recording method used in
the files did not permit us to accurately identify them. They were, however, included in the
aggregate felony case analysis.
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burglary, residential burglary, possession of a stolen vehicle, unarmed
robbery, armed robbery, and aggravated battery. Finally, we examined
cases involving offenses that continued to be handled by live hearings
following the implementation of the CCTP. They included first degree
murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, and sexual assault cases.107
These offenses account for less than 3% of the felony cases. The virtue of
looking at these cases separately is that if the implementation of the CCTP
increased bond amounts, it should not have caused an increase for cases that
continued to be conducted by in-person hearings. Therefore, they provide a
control group for felonies that were subjected to CCTP. We examined
these cases separately and compared the pattern of change for these most
serious offenses, which continued to have live hearings, with the pattern of
change for the remaining felonies, which shifted to closed circuit television
hearings after June 1, 1999.
For each of the 204 months between January, 1991 and December,
2007, the average bond amount for cases resulting in bond decisions is
computed for all outcomes examined.108 We graphed the resulting values
and modeled the impact of the change in bail procedure that occurred on
June 1, 1999 (i.e., implementation of the CCTP). All bond amounts were
transformed into constant dollars using the consumer price index (CPI)
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to control for inflation over time.
The CPI is based upon a 1982 base of 100 so a CPI of 110 indicates 10%
inflation since 1982. All graphs and analyses are expressed in constant
dollars.
Interrupted time series analysis is used to examine whether the change
from in-person hearings to closed circuit television hearings caused a rise in
felony bond amounts. 109 We first used time series plots to assess the
functional form of the time series and to visually examine the effects of the
policy. We then used analytic models to quantify the amount and

107

We analyzed all cases together as a single group. To examine the sensitivity of the
result, we also excluded sexual assault cases and examined homicide cases alone. No
difference was observed in the results.
108
The only cases omitted from these analyses were the small percentage (6%) of cases
that resulted in denial of bail. We analyzed these cases separately in order to evaluate
whether any change in the bond levels could reflect a shift away from high bond amounts to
outright denial of bail.
109
With extensive time series data and a clear intervention time point—June 1, 1999—an
interrupted time series analysis design provides a strong test of the immediate and long term
effects of an intervention or policy.
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significance of any observed changes.110 The key is to analyze whether the
change in average bond mean and growth rate differ significantly from what
one would expect (based on prior trajectory) if the policy had not been in
place. The null hypotheses for all models are that the mean and growth rate
in bond amount do not differ significantly from before to after the
implementation of CCTP.111
Errors in time series data are often correlated. For example, the bond
amounts for a particular felony offense at two adjacent time points may be
more similar than bond amounts set at time points that are farther apart.
Failure to model this correlation may result in an underestimation of
standard errors and overestimation of the significance of intervention
effects.
To adjust for serially correlated errors, we examine the
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of each outcome model’s
residuals to determine its correlation structure. If significant, the correlation
is explicitly modeled in the error term. 112 For most models, we are able to
110

Depending on the outcome, the functional form of the best fitting model may be
linear (1), quadratic (2), or cubic (3). Respectively, their analytic models are as follow:
(1) Yt = β0 + β1(timet) + β2(interventiont) + β3(time x interventiont) + εt
(2) Yt = β0 + β1(timet) + β2(timet)2 + β3(interventiont) + β4(time x interventiont)
+ β5(time x interventiont)2 + εt
(3) Yt = β0 + β1(timet) + β2(timet)2 + β3(timet)3 + β4(interventiont)
+ β5(time x interventiont) + β6(time x intervention t)2
+ β7( time x interventiont)3 + εt
where Yt is the average bond amount adjusted for inflation in the month observed at time t;
time is a continuous variable centered at the point of intervention to indicate the month at
time t; the addition of time2 and time3 in the model specifies the functional form as quadratic
or cubic instead of linear; intervention is an indicator for time t occurring before
(intervention=0) or after (intervention=1) the policy change; and time x intervention is a
continuous variable specifying the number of months after the intervention at time t, with
(time x intervention)2 and (time x intervention)3 again specifying nonlinear functional forms
of the model.
111
For average change in bond amount at the point of intervention, the null hypotheses
are β2=0 if model is linear, β3=0 if model is quadratic, and β4=0 if model is cubic. To model
the change in average bond amount growth rate, a linear model is used to analyze all
outcomes. Here, the null hypothesis is β3=0 for all outcomes.
112
Most outcomes in the study have been identified as (1) first order autoregressive (AR1) where error in time t depends on the error in the previous time period; (2) first order
moving average (MA-1) where error at time t depends on the random shock in the previous
time period; or (3) first order autoregressive, moving average (ARMA) where error in time t
depends on both error and random shock in the previous period. The error term, depending
on its identified structure, is modeled as follows:
εt = φ1εt-1 + γt if the process has been identified as a first order autoregressive; or
εt = γt + θ1γt-1 if the process has been identified as a first order moving average process; or
εt = φ1εt-1 + γt + θ1γt-1 if the process has been identified as a first order autoregressive, moving
average (ARMA).
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model the autocorrelation in the error term and reduce the model’s residuals
to white noise. The lone exception is armed robbery which still shows
signs of autocorrelation after attempts to identify and control its correlation
structure. Nevertheless, the estimates do not affect our overall conclusion
and results from the best fitting models are presented.
D. THE RESULTS

The time series graph for the combined offenses subjected to CCTP
shows a large change in bond amount immediately after June 1, 1999, the
date when the CCPT went into effect (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

The graph also indicates that the increase was permanent. Not only
did the average bond amount fail to return to pre-CCTP level, it continued
to climb after the intervention. Using a log linear model (data not shown)
to obtain an average rate of change in percentages before and after the
implementation of the CCTP, results indicated that the average monthly rate
of change in bond amount before the CCTP was significantly different from
the average monthly rate of change after the CCTP. Specifically, bond
amounts were decreasing at roughly 0.66% per month prior to the CCTP,
but only at a rate of 0.02% (0.66 + -0.64) per month after the CCTP, thus
confirming the pattern visible in the graph. Analytic results (see Table 1)
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also showed a significantly greater than expected change in the average
bond amount immediately after the CCTP implementation.
For all combined offenses that shifted to televised bail hearings, this
change was an increase of roughly $20,958 or 51%. 113

Table 1
Treated Offenses
****

Coef.

Constant
Time
Time x Time
Time x Time x Time
Intervention
Intervention x Time
Intervention x Time x
Time
Intervention x Time x
Time x Time
ARMA
MA (moving average
- order 1)
AR (autoregressive
component - order 1)
Model Sig.
N. of cases
Model Chi Square
Akaike
Schwarz's information
criterion
Portmanteau test for
white noise
*
p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
113

Non-Treated Offenses

***

****

Std. Err.

***

**

Coef.

***

33083.67
612.66***
21.87***
0.14***
20958.32***
-394.61***

2564.63
205.64***
4.44***
0.03***
3708.64***
320.56***

-25.01***

6.80***

-0.14***

0.04***

Std. Err.

***

430027.67
2043.88***

32800.92***
597.17***

55494.15***
-3649.42***

40216.03***
748.44***

-0.71***

0.18***

0.83***

0.14***

0.00***
204***
4111.32***
4141.18***

0.00***
204***
5242.44***
5265.67***

717.36***

142.03***

0.14***

0.07***

To be sure that cases with high bond amounts were not occurring in the wake of the
CCTP merely because judges were setting bond in cases in which they would otherwise have
denied bail, we examined the rate of denied bail cases over time. In contrast to the series
involving bond amount for cases subjected to the CCTP, there was little change in the
percentage of treated cases that resulted in a denial of bail. The percentage of cases in which
bail was denied dropped by 1% at the time that the video hearings began. The drop cannot
account for the dramatic rise in average bond amount. Note that our data set and analysis of
“denied bail” cases began in 1996, rather than 1991, because for some unknown reason the
data set included few cases involving denial of bail prior to June of 1994 and then showed a
sharp increase in cases denied bail peaking around June of 1995 before sharply declining.
The percentage of cases denied bail then dropped over the time period from 1996 through
2007, from approximately 10% to under 4%. We have no explanation for the complex
functional form of this time series, so we confined our analysis to the data between 1996 and
2007.
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To test the robustness of this result, we examined separately the
change in bond amount for each of the six felonies that were subjected to
the CCTP: (1) armed robbery; (2) unarmed robbery; (3) residential
burglary; (4) non-residential burglary; (5) possession of a stolen motor
vehicle; and (6) aggravated battery. Time series graphs of these offenses
(see Figures 2 to 7) again showed a clear and sharp discontinuity at the
point of intervention for each of these felonies.
Analytic models confirmed the observed visual change as statistical
tests showed significantly greater than expected increases immediately after
the intervention.114 The average bond amount increase ranged from 54% to
90% depending on the offense. For armed robbery, the increase was
$74,699, or 58%. For unarmed robbery, the increase was $54,227, or 86%.
Residential burglary showed an increase of $53,274, or 90%; nonresidential
burglary an increase of $26,592, or 64%; possession of a stolen motor
vehicle an increase of $25,605, or 78%; and aggravated battery an increase
of $73,024, or 70%.

Figure 2

114

Models associated with Figures 2-7 are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 7

To examine whether the above changes in average bond amounts over
time were temporary or permanent after the intervention, we again used log
linear models to examine the average monthly rate of change in percentages
before and after the implementation of the CCTP. All felony offenses
subjected to the CCTP showed decreasing average bond amounts that
ranged from -0.2% to -1.0% prior to the intervention. After the policy
change, these offenses showed increasing bond amounts of roughly 0.14%
to 0.57% over time. All changes in rate before and after intervention for the
above felonies were statistically significant. To confirm that the CCTP was
the cause of the increase in bond level, we examined average change in
bond amount for the combined homicide and serious sexual assault cases.
These are offenses that continued to have live hearings and therefore could
serve as a control group. If the CCTP caused the observed rise in bond
amounts for treated felonies (those subjected to the CCTP), we should see
no greater than expected significant change for the non-treated felonies
(those not subject to the CCTP). Indeed, results show that immediately
after the CCTP went into effect, the average bond amount for the nontreated felonies rose an insignificant 13% (see Figure 8 and Table 1), while
the average for treated felonies rose a significant 51%. 115
115

See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
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After the CCTP went into effect, bond amounts for the treated cases
generally held steady with results showing a close to zero decrease of
-0.02% per month, while the non-treated felonies steadily decreased at a
monthly rate of .42%.

Figure 8

E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF THE CCTP

The results of the analysis show that average bond amounts rose
substantially following the implementation of the CCTP. The change
cannot be attributed to general trends or seasonal variations as none were
observed. As both the graphs (Figures 1-7) and the statistical models
clearly reveal, the substantial increase in average bond level immediately
followed the implementation of the CCTP on June 1, 1999. The average
bond amount for the offenses that shifted to televised hearings increased by
an average of 51% across all of the CCTP cases. In separate analyses,
increases of between 54% and 90% occurred for six major felonies
subjected to the CCTP. In contrast, the average bond levels for the
combined serious sexual assault and homicide cases, which continued to
have live hearings, changed an insignificant 13% (Figure 8) and when
analyzed alone, the homicide cases showed almost no change at all in
average bond level following the implementation of the CCTP. These
results demonstrate that the change in bail procedures not only led to a large
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and abrupt increase in the average bond amount for felony cases handled by
televised bail hearings after June 1, 1999, but also produced a steady rise in
bond levels over time.
V. THE FUTURE OF VIDEOCONFERENCED HEARINGS: LESSONS LEARNED
AND REMAINING QUESTIONS
The results from the Cook County Bail Study show that the defendants
were significantly disadvantaged by the videoconferenced bail proceedings
held between 1999 and 2009. This finding provides the evidence whose
absence defeated the bail applicant in LaRose v. Superintendent when the
court rejected the applicant’s due process argument. 116 There, the court
found no evidence that the use of video “would adversely bias a judge’s
opinion of a defendant.” 117 The court specifically relied upon the fact that
“[n]o evidence was offered to suggest that judges set bail at a higher
amount for defendants who were arraigned by the video procedures than by
in-person procedures.” 118 The substantial increases in bail levels that
immediately followed the implementation of videoconferenced bail
hearings in Cook County, and which occurred only for the offenses that
shifted to videoconferenced hearings, provide precisely the evidence that
was missing in LaRose and should raise questions about the harmful effects
of videoconferenced hearings on defendants.
Looking to the future, important questions remain. First, a variety of
influences may account for the disadvantage experienced by the defendants
subjected to the videoconferenced bail hearings implemented in Cook
County in 1999. The picture quality and sound available today are far
superior to the technology that existed when the equipment was installed in
Cook County. It may be that the quality of the available video display was
too degraded or the size of the video monitor was too small to enable the
judge to adequately view the defendant. In addition, in order to watch the
judge in the courtroom on the monitor, the defendant in Cook County had
to look at the monitor rather than at the camera that was capturing his own
image and projecting it into the courtroom. He thus could appear on the
courtroom monitor as if he was avoiding direct eye contact. Modern
technology with a camera embedded in the viewing monitor would be able
to eliminate this problem. The inability of the defendant to see the judge
clearly may also have discouraged the defendant from speaking up when it
would have helped him to say something. We cannot tell from the currently
available research whether the defendant’s willingness and ability to
116
117
118

702 A.2d 326, 329 (N.H. 1997).
Id.
Id.
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communicate would be unimpaired if better technology were used.
Although modern business may be rapidly embracing the ability to hold
meetings and conduct collaborative work with videoconferencing
equipment, the typical defendant who appears in court for a bail hearing
may find such equipment both unfamiliar and alienating.
The particular videoconferencing technology used in Cook County
was not the only potential explanation for the negative outcomes the
program produced. Nor is it clear that modern technology could eliminate
what may be inherent flaws in a procedure that has the defendant in a
remote location. The remote location of the defendant meant that attorneys
had little or no opportunity to gather information from the client before the
hearing. Information that could have made the defendant a more plausible
candidate for pretrial release was typically limited to that gleaned by a
representative from the public defender’s office who asked the defendant a
few questions in the holding cell before the hearing began and provided the
answers to the public defender in the courtroom. In an important
experiment, Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster, and Shawn Bushway
provided legal representation in the courtroom for defendants who
participated in their bail review hearings only through a two-way video and
audio system. 119 They showed that those defendants randomly selected to
receive legal representation were more likely to obtain bail reductions and
to be released on their own recognizance. 120 The attorneys had an
opportunity to gather significant information on the defendants before these
hearings, so it is unclear whether it was the additional information that the
attorneys were able to provide to the court or the mere participation of an
advocate for the defendant that produced the reductions, but the study
highlights the potential importance of the role that attorneys can play in bail
hearings.
Many of these procedural defects could be reduced or eliminated.
Others would be more difficult to overcome. The location of the defense
attorney in the courtroom and not next to her client may prevent crucial
consultation. To remedy that loss, it would be necessary to provide the
defendant with a way to communicate privately with his attorney. The
remote defendant would have to be able to signal the attorney in the
courtroom that he needs to have a private conversation. A defendant might,
for example, be given a device that he could activate to cause a paired
receiver to vibrate in his attorney’s pocket to signal a desire to communicate
privately. Unlike the brief whisper that can occur when the defendant and
his attorney are standing side-by-side, this private conversation would
119
120

Colbert et al., supra note 76.
Id. at 1720.
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require a private communication channel to preserve confidentiality and
could only occur through a somewhat awkward disruption in what is
typically a brief hearing.
Finally, there may be some aspects of live presence that affect the
believability of an individual. Indeed, studies comparing credibility
judgments and other ratings of live versus televised child witnesses have
found that the method of viewing affected witness ratings. For example,
mock jurors rated child witnesses who testified in person as more accurate,
intelligent, attractive, and honest than children who testified on closed
circuit television.121 Similarly, studies in educational settings suggest that
some nonverbal behaviors by teachers, such as facial expression, tone of
voice, and eye gaze, influence how students evaluate the teacher.122 In
immigration hearings, in which the courts place great importance on the
testimony of the asylum applicant, there has been a movement to hold
asylum hearings by videoconference, a move sanctioned by Congress in
2006 when it shortened the removal period for detained aliens. 123 A recent
study of decisions in asylum hearings during 2004 and 2005 compared the
rate of asylum grants for individuals who had in-person and video
conference hearings before the Congressional mandate went into effect. 124
The vast majority of hearings were in-person and it is not clear how cases
were selected for videoconferenced hearings, but individuals who had inperson hearings were nearly twice as likely to be granted asylum as those
who had a hearing held by video-conference. 125
If there is something about the presence of a live individual that cannot
be replicated, even with modern technology, then videoconferenced bail
hearings cannot avoid a sacrifice of information that may threaten the
quality of bail decisions, and a dehumanization that encourages a harsher
response than would occur if the judge were faced with a live individual.126
121
Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’
Ability to Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed-Circuit Trials, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
339 (2001); see also Gail S. Goodman et. al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed
Circuit Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165
(1998).
122
Spencer D. Kelly & Leslie H. Goldsmith, Gesture and Right Hemisphere Involvement
in Evaluating Lecture Material, 4 GESTURE 25, 26 (2004).
123
Note, Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1181
(2009).
124
Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line
Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
259, 271 (2008).
125
Id. at 280.
126
Even changes in camera focus can dramatically affect lay and professional judgments
about the voluntariness of a confession. See, e.g., G. Daniel Lassiter et. al., Evidence of the
Camera Perspective Bias in Authentic Videotaped Interrogations: Implications for Emerging
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Nor can any hearing that entails judgments about a defendant or other
witness. At this point, we simply cannot tell which of the differences
between live and videoconferenced hearings, or which combination of these
differences, was responsible for the large jump in bond levels that followed
the implementation of videoconferenced bail hearings in Cook County. The
results do tell us that Cook County Chief Judge Timothy Evans was wise to
reinstate live hearings in light of the costs that the videoconference
procedure, as implemented, imposed on defendants subjected to it.
The attractions of technology invite courts to implement these
apparently cost-saving measures, particularly when the demand for court
resources is high. Ironically, an overeager welcome of technology can
impose costs of its own. By boosting bond levels and decreasing the ability
of defendants to obtain release pending trial, videoconferenced bail hearings
may actually impose additional financial costs on the justice system by
leading to more pretrial incarceration of defendants who would otherwise
be released.
Inefficient courts that waste judge and attorney time are always
appropriate targets for reform, and modern technology offers some
unambiguously attractive ways to improve efficiency. 127 For example,
document cameras can enable attorneys to organize and present exhibits
electronically. 128 Video monitors, digital projectors, and projection screens
are in wide use, at least in federal courts, making it possible to easily use
images to supplement more traditional verbal presentations. 129 The push to
allow remote witnesses to testify is both plausible and compelling in
situations in which the witness is unavailable. A live videoconferenced
procedure that permits real time testimony and cross-examination can
provide a closer analog to live testimony than the use of a deposition
transcript or even a video evidence deposition that lacks real time crossexamination. 130 An expert witness, experienced with technology, may have

Reform in the Criminal Justice System, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 157 (2009).
The shift from a live to a video image is likely to produce effects that are at least as
substantial.
127
For compendia of current and potential uses of courtroom technology, see FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, EFFECTIVE USE OF COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY: A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO
PRETRIAL AND TRIAL (2001); NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE
DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT (2009).
128
See Frederic I. Lederer, Introduction: What Have We Wrought?, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 637, 641 (2004) (providing a fictional example of how technology can expedite
a pretrial hearing).
129
Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know About the Effects
of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731, 733 (2004).
130
Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through Screens, 12 WM. & MARY Bill
Rts. J. 769, 773 (2004).
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no difficulty participating remotely in a hearing. Yet when the government
prepares to bring criminal charges against a defendant, the justice system
must confront serious questions about the impact of technology on the
defendant’s rights. 131 The challenge is to avoid too swift an attraction to
technology as a solution to perceived inefficiencies. Even outside the
context of a trial or other proceeding that implicates the Confrontation
Clause, the defendant can suffer a significant loss if the procedure involves
more than a pro forma appearance. A bail hearing is in that category. It can
result in a decision that deprives the accused of his liberty despite the
presumption of innocence, and may interfere with his ability to effectively
prepare a defense. 132
When the legal system is pressured by heavy caseloads and limited
resources, quick fixes promised by new technology threaten to damage
rather than promote justice. That is what appears to have happened in Cook
County. Technology offers great promise, but procedural justice is the
currency of a fair and legitimate court system. The needed approach is to
conduct pilot programs that include an evaluation of the operation and
impact of proposed reforms, rather than simply to impose dramatic systemwide changes, as Cook County did with the videoconferencing bail
“reform.” As Judge Joseph Goodwin wisely observed in describing the use
of video proceedings in federal criminal trials, the justice system must
“carefully segregate those inefficiencies that are mere products of time and
place—which we would be foolish to retain—from those that are
deliberately built into our system to spare a free people the convenience of
the guillotine.” 133 The warning signs from the Cook County experience
counsel caution.
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For a list of potential threats to defendants’ rights, see supra text accompanying notes
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